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PANENTHEISTIC ELEMENTS IN WOLFHART 
PANNENBERG’S NOTION OF GOD 
 




This paper will focus on the panentheistic elements found in Wolfhart 
Pannenberg’s Systematic Theology Vol.1 based on section 6.4 “God’s 
Spirituality, Knowledge, and Will” and section 6.5 “The Concept of Divine 
Action and the Structure of the Doctrine of the Divine Attributes” 
respectively.1 In his exposition, Pannenberg dialectically explores the 
possibility of a redefinition of the notion of God and rejects the 
anthropomorphic analogies and the Greek understanding of God as nous 
in order to emphasize the idea of God as Spirit and thus facilitate the 
intersection between the natural sciences and Christian theology. Thus, 
based on the Hebrew notion of the spirit as “wind/breath” and using a 
naturalistic framework, Pannenberg offers an insightful yet panentheistic 
view of the Spirit of God as a field of force that binds the Three Persons 
of the Trinity.  
 
God as Reason vs. God as Spirit 
 
Pannenberg begins section 6.4 “God’s Spirituality, Knowledge, and 
Will” by discussing the concept of God as a personal being in relation to 
his self-conscious acting. He argues that in the early stages of Christian 
theology God was not necessarily conceived as a “supreme, incorporeal 
reason.”2 Pannenberg cites 1 Cor. 2:11, 2 Cor. 3:17, and John 4:24 as 
evidence that New Testament writers seemed to understand God as pneuma 
(spirit) and not as nous (reason/mind), as Philo and Middle Platonism 
conceived.3 Pannenberg then asserts that such a trend (the Greek notion 
                                                 
1 Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology Vol.1 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991). 
 
2 Pannenberg, Systematic Theology Vol.1, 371. 
 
3 Pannenberg, Systematic Theology Vol.1, 371. 
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of God as nous) was not uncommon at all because of “the emphasis on the 
incomparability of God with created things.”4 In this respect Pannenberg 
claims that because of the closeness of the incomparability with the 
incorporeality of God, it was not difficult that Christian theology could 
also understand God as reason, as Origen did.5 However, as Pannenberg 
also writes, “Certainly Socinian theology noted the exegetical problem of 
equating the biblical concept of spirit with the idea of incorporeal reason.”6 
Among some of the explanations that support such a view, there is the fact 
that the Hebrew term ruah does not mean reason. Then Pannenberg claims 
that every statement of the New Testament about the Spirit must be 
understood according to the Jewish perspective, since the connotation of 
the word ruah as spirit/wind is not only found in Hebrew but also in Greek: 
pneuma has the connotation (at least since Aniximides) of “breath, wind, 
air, life-force.” 7 This leads Pannenberg to assert that the understanding of 
pneuma as a rational or conscious spirit is linked with the [Neo] Platonic 
school rather than the Stoics' Pantheistic philosophy, something that 
favored, according to him, the transcendental view of God.8 Now, such a 
link seemed to be problematic for Pannenberg, who considers that "the 
identifying of pneuma and nous put theology on a path that is alien to the 
biblical view of God –and the path of a much too anthropomorphic view 
of God.”9 The problem with Pannenberg’s assertion here is that he does 
not consider whether the Spirit can be rational (both nous and pneuma) but 
not merely rational (only nous). 
 
Redefining the Notion of God 
 
Pannenberg goes on further to claim that the anthropomorphic 
understanding of God is product mainly of understanding God as rational 
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5 Pannenberg, Systematic Theology Vol.1, 372. 
 
6 Pannenberg, Systematic Theology Vol.1, 372. 
 
7 Pannenberg, Systematic Theology Vol.1, 373. 
 
8 Pannenberg, Systematic Theology Vol.1, 374. 
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spirit or reason, position that came to us via Anselm's heavy use of 
Augustine’s analogies of the Trinity and the use of Aristotelian metaphysics 
in High Scholasticism.10 With Scholasticism, the anthropomorphic view of 
God was strengthened and was linked to the concept of the will of God, 
which led “the Christian view laid itself open to serious criticism.”11 
Because of this, Pannenberg emphasizes Spinoza’s philosophy of 
separating will and intellect, since for Spinoza the only way we can talk about 
God’s will and intellect is metaphorically.12 To support his position, 
Pannenberg briefly mentions other philosophers who, similar to Spinoza, 
criticized the ingrained notion of God of their time: Hume discarded the 
idea that God is responsible for design (something that presupposes a 
rational God); Fitche rejected the idea of a personal and anthropomorphic 
God for a divine self-consciousness; Hegel promoted the idea of God as 
an Absolute Spirit emerging out the world.13 After discussing briefly 
Hegel’s conception of God and his understanding of the Trinity, 
Pannenberg returns to the discussion with Spinoza of divine reason and 
reaffirms his position that one should talk of the divine intellect only 
metaphorically.14 He writes,  
 
Those who are aware of the difficulties will have to agree with the 
verdict of Spinoza that it is just as metaphorical to speak of the 
intellect of God as to call God the “rock” of our salvation...or the 
“light” on our path, or to speak of the Word of God.15  
 
It is noteworthy to observe Pannenberg’s emphasis in mentioning 
Spinoza, Hegel, and other philosophers who worked with the notion of 
God were characterized by a highly-rationalized philosophy of religion. 
This might serve us as a hint about what Pannenberg is trying to do in this 
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section about God’s spirituality: a redefinition of the notion of God that 
might work simultaneously for both natural sciences and theology.  
 
God’s Knowledge and Will 
 
In regard to the divine knowledge, Pannenberg believes that the fact 
that God has knowledge means that all things are present to him. He states, 
"When we speak of God’s knowledge we mean that nothing in all his 
creation escapes him. All things are present to him and are kept by him in 
his presence. This is not necessary knowledge in the sense of what is meant 
by human knowledge and awareness."16  
 
In regard to God’s will, Pannenberg is of the opinion that the Old 
Testament "has no single concept of the will of God" but commands and 
a series of terms for the divine good pleasure. In the New Testament, 
claims Pannenberg, one finds the idea of the divine will of Jesus (cf. Matt. 
6:10, 7:21, 12:50, 21:31, 26:42 and John 4:34, 5:30, 6:38-39), and notes the 
link between the divine word and the Spirit of God.17 The Spirit of God, 
Pannenberg adds, "finds expression in the divine good pleasure...[and] is 
imparted to those with whom God is well pleased."18 Pannenberg 
highlights here the connection between the will of God and the Spirit, and 
affirms that such a connection is consistent with the Scriptures. In this 
respect, he asserts that the Spirit of God is not simply nous, but a "creative 
and life-giving dynamic."19 Further, based on Psalm 139:7, Pannenberg 
creatively writes, "The Spirit is the force field of God's mighty presence."20 
As Pannenberg affirms, his understanding contrasts with Origen's 





                                                 
16 Pannenberg, Systematic Theology Vol.1, 379-80. 
 
17 Pannenberg, Systematic Theology Vol.1, 382. 
 
18 Pannenberg, Systematic Theology Vol.1, 382. 
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The Spirit of God as a Field of Force 
 
Pannenberg’s discussion provides his readers at least plausible 
suggestions of panentheistic elements in his theological exposition. 
Nonetheless, this does not mean Pannenberg embraces Panentheism in its 
totality, but that he strongly uses panentheistic ideas to support his 
theological vision. Pannenberg’s understanding of God may be of interest 
to Christian theology for its novelty and the doors that open. He writes, 
"Some astonishing possibilities thus open up for a new understanding of 
the relations between the trinitarian persons and the divine essence that is 
common to all of them" (383). Now, there are still some remarkable 
aspects which must be highlighted, and which illuminate us about 
Pannenberg’s deviation from the traditional view of God in his theological 
construct. By using Michael Faraday's Force Field Theory, Pannenberg 
presents his readers with some stimulating ideas understand God’s divine 
essence: 
a) The deity as field of force can find equal manifestation in all Three Persons of the 
Trinity. The Spirit of God would work as a binding force of the Three 
Persons. In that regard, it is important to pay attention to Pannenberg's 
comment that says, “The trinitarian persons...are simply manifestations 
and [eternal] forms of the one divine essence.”21 In other words, the 
Three Persons of the Trinity are “modes” or manifestations of the 
Deity that are always actualizing themselves.  
 
b) The Spirit of God is the essence of God. “The one God is the living God 
comes to expression in the living fellowship of Father, Son, and Spirit,” 
Pannenberg writes. Thus, the Spirit would be the "force field of the 
Father and Son's fellowship."22  
As seen, in Pannenberg’s argumentation, it is necessary to discard the 
idea of nous (reason/mind) as the subject of divine action. This matter is 
discussed in section 6.5 titled “The Concept of Divine Action and the 
Structure of the Doctrine of the Divine Attributes.” What allows 
Pannenberg not to assign divine action to the Deity is his understanding 
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of God as the eternal divine essence which is impersonal, and not itself 
subject. In that respect, Pannenberg claims that only the Three Persons of 
the Trinity are the direct subjects of the divine action.”23 With this 
statement, much confusion arises concerning the personhood of the Spirit 
of God. Some readers might question Pannenberg’s understanding of the 
Spirit of God as a force field, where the Spirit’s personhood is apparently 
downplayed. It seems that for Pannenberg the Spirit of God and the Holy 
Spirit are two different things.  
 
Discussing divine action, Pannenberg affirms that action “denotes the 
outward activity of a will...an activity which produces effects that are 
different from itself…[thus] [t]he commonality of action [of the Three 
Persons]...can be only a manifestation of the unity of life and essence by 
which they are always linked already.”24 The problem of divine causality is 
also brought to the table: the Spirit of God seen as a field of force is 
incorporeal and impersonal, but it might affect the natural world. In 
regards to the eternal nature of God, Pannenberg understands such an 
attribute, as “God’s present embraces the past as well as the future.”25 In 
doing so, Pannenberg departed from the common Platonic understanding 
in early Christian theology, and instead embraced Plotinus's view of 
eternity as "the presence of the totality of life.”26 For Pannenberg, saying 
that God is eternal means that for God, all time is before him as a whole 
–past, present, and future. As he writes, “any span of time is simply like 
yesterday in the sight of God.”27 This discussion is important since for 
Plotinus, as Pannenberg notes, time is conceived as “the dissolution of the 
unity of life into a sequence of separate moments, and yet it is constituted 
a sequence by the references to the eternal totality”28 in contrast to the 
Platonic, and thus Augustinian, view of time as “a creation of God and 
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thus separate from God's eternity.”29 Examining this further, Pannenberg 
talks more about the influence of Plotinus's view of time in Boethius 
(though he does not endorse it) and goes on critically with Barth’s 
understanding of the eternity of God and the relation between the concept 
of time, eternity as divine attribute, and the Trinity.30  
 
Usefulness of Plotinus’s Conception of Time 
 
Noteworthy to mention is Pannenberg’s comment on Plotinus's 
concept of time and its potential usefulness for Christian theology: He 
states,  
 
Christian theology let slip the chance to combine NT eschatology and the 
understanding of God's eternity with the help of Plotinus's analysis of 
time...In the future of the divine rule the life of creation will be renewed for 
participation in the eternity of God. In it eternity comes together with time.... 
It is the place of eternity itself...the source of the mighty working of his 
Spirit.31   
 
Therefore, world history is for Pannenberg of high interest because it is a 
means where God is manifested and actualized. Besides, for Pannenberg 
the future seems not to be actual but a possibility. Having this in view, 
history would be “the path that leads to the future of God’s glory.”32 Thus, 
“[t]he past remains present to the eternal God and the future is already 
present to him.”33 Pannenberg asserts that the divine presence fills 
everything, heaven and earth, in the sense that such a presence “permeates 
and comprehends all things.”34 This idea of permeability of God’s presence 
might resemble, at least indirectly, pantheistic ideas that the divine is 
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present in all and in everything all the time, though one should consider 
that this point could also be made from classical theism as well.  
 
Other Reflections about the Spirit 
 
In Vol.2 of his Systematic Theology, Pannenberg asserts again that “[t]he 
Spirit of God is the creative principle of movement as well as life.”35 One 
sees here a reinforcement of Pannenberg's panentheistic understanding of 
the Spirit. For Pannenberg while the Holy Spirit is personal, the Spirit of 
God is, instead, an impersonal field force.36 In this respect he states, “the 
person of the Holy Spirit is one of the personal concentrations of the 
essence of God as Spirit in distinction from the Father and the Son. The 
person of the Holy Spirit is not himself to be understood as the field but 
as a unique manifestation (singularity) of the field of the divine 
essentiality.”37  
 
Even though Pannenberg clarifies some points about the distinction 
between the Spirit of God and the Holy Spirit in his theology, I find that 
his position might still arise at least some ambiguity regarding the 
personhood of Spirit: God’s Spirit is both the Holy Spirit (the Third 
Person of the Trinity/a concrete manifestation of the Spirit of God) and a 




Pannenberg tries to dehellenize Christian theology by rejecting the 
Greek understanding of God as nous (reason/mind) and rescuing the 
Hebrew idea of ruah as “wind/breath.” Although Pannenberg’s theology 
is innovative and brings significant insight into Christian theology, such 
insights regrettably have a cost: First, although many scholars consider that 
Pannenberg is not trying to promote a panentheistic understanding of 
God, his view of God sometimes seems to resemble Panentheism in 
several areas —his concept of time, history, and God (cf. Plotinus’ view of 
God as the One, Reason, and Spirit). Second, even more serious is the 
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tension in Pannenberg’s theology between his notion of God as field force 
and the notion of God traditionally found in early Christian theology. This 
tension makes Pannenberg’s theological vision to be susceptible to a series 
of questions regarding the plausibility and coherence of his arguments and 
ideas. One of the areas of concern I find, for instance, is the downplay of 
the personhood of the God alongside his appropriation of the natural 
sciences –-the Field Force Theory— in theology. I ask, if the Spirit is both 
an impersonal field force and a personal manifestation of the Trinity, how 
can we know with certainty who the Spirit really is?  It seems that 
Pannenberg collects divergent pieces from different areas of study in order 
to construct his theological view of the Spirit: He rejects the Greek notion 
of God as nous, but at the same time, he uses a lot of Plotinus’s Pantheistic 
material where the concept of nous is central. He tries to rescue the Hebrew 
notion of God as Spirit in Christian theology by discarding the Greek 
notion of God as reason/mind, but at the same time, there is a strong 
rationalization in his theology of the Spirit, which it is alien to the Hebrew 
thought. Besides, Pannenberg is oblivious that the Hebrew term ruah does 
not only mean “wind/breath,” but it also refers to “God, spirits, gods, and 
so on.”  
 
Overall, Pannenberg’s exposition of his theology of the Spirit and the 
divine attributes does not reduce Christian theology to natural sciences, 
though Pannenberg does strongly rationalize the theistic understanding of 
God. If Pannenberg wanted to establish a notion of God that works 
simultaneously for both classical theism and science, he would have been 
better off focusing on a notion of God that might understand the Spirit as 
both pneuma (life-force) and nous (reason/mind). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
